1. Introduction
It is possible but also
necessary to qualify the present situation in Greece as an economic, social but
also ecological disaster. It is a clear proof that pure neoliberal policies to
manage a debt issue can only lead to a dramatic collapse of productive capacities,
social services and capacities to cope with environmental issues. But it is
even more important to admit that all complete programs to stabilise and
develop the economy, the well known “memoranda”, and thus increase the
resources available to assume the payment of the debt, have been unrealistic
and did not realise their promises. The result is that the depression, the loss
of productive capacity, the stagnation of investment and exports, are a trap
which the most aggressive neoliberal mesures are uncapable of questionning.
The recent years have
shown that there is no project for the greek economy and society other than the
existence of investment possibilities for some enterprises, without declared
aims for the productive capacity of the economy, or the dramatic social and
environmental issues, and also without convincing macroeconomic projections for
the future. This is not simply a question of having or not having a plan and a
government assuming it, but mainly of having or not a social alliance
supporting a project for the whole of society and managing the proper
institutions to develop it. The greek case shows that pure neoliberal policies
(applied long before the memoranda) to manage a debt crisis, lead to a dead
end, since there is no class willing to serve a global development project, and
since there is no effort to create the institutions that can govern such a
project at all levels of the public authorities.
Until now the logic of the
left government policies for all development issues, did not question the
traditional keynesian approach, hoping and assuming that the increase of demand
will “restart” the economy so that gradually the main economic and social
issues will be tackled. This was the backbone of the SYRIZA program before the 2015
elections and the argument behind the central importance given to the reduction
of the debt payments, so that resources would be available for “development”.
Now that this perspective is still under discussion, and the austerity mesures
of the 3rd memorandum are under way, there has been a shift towards
supply side expectations and the “deus ex machina” of foreign investment. There
is almost no preparation for some sort of planning of reconstruction (in all
ways) or some systematic effort to invent and construct new institutions and
policy instruments to assume in reality a reconstruction process, with defined
necessary productive, social and ecological aims.
The left government in
Greece was not prepared to take such a turn in comparison with the existing
institutional framework, and the choices made concern “really existing
policies”, that are the heritage of the past, that is of the neoliberal
adaptation of the clientelistic post war model. This combination of neoliberal
choices and clientelistic methods is the key explanation to understand the long
term degradation – since the 80’s - of the greek economy, a process that led to
the deep crisis of the post 2008 period and the loss of any sort of dynamism of
the capitalist economy. But it is also the key to understand the destructive
effect of the management by the european institutions of all successive
strategies concerning cohesion, regional development, competitivity etc. The
present “blindness” of the european institutions concerning the results of the
policies and measures imposed by the “memoranda”, is to a great extent due to
the refusal of european politicians and technocrats to make some sort of
evaluation of the neoliberal policies applied during a long period of time.
The understanding not only
of the destructive consequences of austerity policies, but also of the impasse
for capitalist reproduction itself to which lead neoliberal policies, is
crucial to produce a valid evaluation of the present moment in european
history. There is no possibility to reproduce and develop capitalism without
the expression by economic and political forces representing capital, of the
will to construct social alliances and institutional instruments assuming a new
project. The combination in Greece of a state assisted financial capital
managing its immense non performing loans with the help of public money, of a
dramatically reduced industrial sector with no substantial promising sectoral
activities, of deposits fleeing to foreign banks, and of a sea of sme’s struggling
to survive against depression, new taxes and old loans, has led to the
impossibility of a global project and the necessity of a serious questionning
of the institutional framework inherited from the past period.
The main and dominant
method to implement a global reconstruction project must start with the
recognition of the necessity for a non capitalist way to assume the main
strategic aims for production, social rights and environment. The collapse of
the capitalist regime must lead to methods capable of constructing a new regime
with a strong and determining public sector, and the capacity to construct
agreements and plans with the collaboration of the private sector and the
social and solidarity economy. Public institutions and public policy instruments
must offer the new framework for the survival and development of private
initiatives, and for the development of the social and solidarity economy. But
this complete reversal, from the reign of private enterpreneurship to the
leading role of the public sector, must be based on a solid and lasting new
social alliance, between popular classes and middle class sectors, which accept
a post capitalist project because they have been struck but the crisis, or
because they have adopted through cognitive processes, institutionalised or
informal, radical positions and projects for society as a whole.
The left, and particularly
the greek left, has neglected the necessity to prepare even for the management
of existing institutions and policy instruments, but mainly for the necessary
reform of the existing institutional framework, not to speak about the planning
of reconstruction according to environmental limits, social needs and
productive possibilities. Even if the aim is to reform the existing framework,
and of course if it is necessary to construct a new economic regime, the left
has to elaborate original plans for the future, and to educate “organic
intellectuals” capable of assuming the implementation of such plans. Governing
does not mean having only ideas and strategic aims for the future, but having
rather precise road maps for change in many important fields, and the personnel
capable of managing the change and the transition. The belief that the existing
institutions of capitalism can be managed in a more efficient and socially
biased way by political and technocratic personnel coming from the left, has in
Greece as elsewhere led to the neglect of the need to elaborate new original
plans and prepare the personnel capable of implementing them. It is a paradox
that parties willing to instaure a completely new approach of priorities at all
levels, and the use of rational methods and solutions, can be incapable of
adopting the corresponding knowledge producing and education processes, as main
functions.
2. The weight of the past
The entry of Greece in the
Commun Market in 1981, coincides with the installation of a socialist
government aiming to reform greek economy and society, in a direction which was
developmentist, and was promising social institutions as well as
competitiveness of national production. The result of the socialist governance
is widely considered to be the instauration of an inefficient, corrupt and
clientelistic political system, but this approach is simplifying the
description of the PASOK Greece and ignoring two important factors that in
reality permitted the survival of the model of development and governance
formed after the civil war: the refusal of the economic elite to question the
basic caracteristics of the economic and social model, and the evolving at that
time turn of the european community towards neoliberal, market and enterprise
centered policies.
The post war model was the
consequence of the formation during the WW2 occupation of an enterpreneurial
class closely dependent on personal and political connections with the state
institutions, but also and mainly of the defeat of the left after the civil war
and the creation of an anti-communist state treating differently the citizens
according to their political beliefs, and maintaining privileged relations at
all levels with special categories of economic interests. Undeclared work was
widely tolerated, salaries were maintained at low levels, trade-unionism was
repressed by the police, and social institutions were elementary. The external
deficit (the lack of international competitiveness) of the economy was managed
through the “export” of work force, tourism, or sailors’ remittances, while the
state institutions remained inefficient and corrupted.
The PASOK governments
during the 80’s had the aim to construct new institutions implementing
industrial policies, but this orientation met a strong opposition from the side
of industrial capital, as no part of this class agreed to reform profoundly the
existing institutions and adopt a new industrial strategy. Industrial capital
was strongly opposed to the increase of salaries (which had been dramatically
reduced during the dictatorship), the instauration of a social state, and thus
the redistribution of income. The rapid increase of public debt during the
decade (up to 100% of GDP by 1993), was due to an increase of social spending
without a parallel redistribution of income. So instead of supporting the
productive capacity through an appropriate industrial policy, to redress a
private economy suffering from a debt crisis and a structural impasse after the
entry of the country into the common market, the deregulation of the banking
sector, previously commanded by the state policies, led to the formation of a
bank cartel which redressed finance capital through high interest rates, and
sank the productive economy.
The counteroffensive of
the right, against the socialist government, adopted a thatcherite program, and
the result was a new socialist victory in 1993, after the Mitsotakis New Democracy
government (1990-1993) lost the battle against the strong trade union
organisations of the public sector, on the issue of privatisation, while trying
to adopt a genuine neoliberal strategy which was already implemented by the
european community. The question of the class alliances is crucial to
understand what happened during the 80’s and the 90’s also. PASOK expressed in
the beginning a strong middle class alliance (with the participation of the
agricultural economy social groups), which was not approved by the capitalist
class, and satisfied the mass of salary earners, through the increase of
salaries and the improvement of social services, but not through the completion
of their institutional presence. The Mitsotakis government tried to implement a
strategy supporting capital and defeating working people, but it was not the
proper moment for such an aggressive neolibal offensive.
The stabilisation of the
political system occurred with the Simitis (PASOK) governments after 1996, when
the “modernisation” strategy formed a clear alliance between capital, middle
classes and privileged salary earners, with a program supporting
“enterpreneurship”, and in particular financial capital, and gradually
advancing towards the privatisation of public enterprises, the reduction of
trade union power, and the flexibilisation of the labour market. All the
“modernisation” declarations did not change the clientelistic methods of
governing economic and industrial policies, and in particular the structural
funds’ european money, nor the deeply corrupted and inefficient public
administration. In the mean time productive capacity and “competitiveness” of
the economy was constantly shrinking because the uncriticaly supported private
sector, was left alone to reproduce it’s obsolite specialisation and it’s
incapacity to adopt innovation strategies, which would have needed strong
institutions capable of implementing strategies developing a competitive
private industrial sector.
The particular
caracteristics of the greek debt crisis are the result of this medium term
dynamic, which led to increasing reduction of taxation and public borrowing,
and also support of consumption and growth through private debt to the banks,
and increasing pressure on salaries especially of young peoples’ earnings and
working and living conditions. This destructive dynamic was strongly
facilitated by the entry into the euro zone, which reduced interest rates and
created the illusion of an indefinite stability and growth. The greek economy
did not only have to manage the debt crisis, but also the loss of control of
institutions managing the economy at the macro or micro level. The period which
started in 2004 with the electoral victory of the right, was the final stage of
the formation of an impasse, since public debt started increasing over 100% of
GDP, the productive capacity was continuing it’s fall, and the public sector
deficit was increasing also, regardless the authorities’ efforts to hide this
dangerous tendency.
3. The destructive effects
of the memoranda
It is well known that the
management of the economy and society according to the plans elaborated by the
Troika, led to a tremendous fall of production and employment, and even the IMF
has been obliged to recognise that several assumptions of these plans were
wrong and had serious negative effects. The expected growth of private
investment and exports never came, and stagnation together with the adoption of
further austerity measures to correct the errors of the past, were the only
consequences of the memoranda logic. Today, despite the efforts of the left
government to apply the agreements made for the 3rd memorandum with
the less negative effects for society and the economy, there are no signs of
recovery of the crucial magnitudes of exports and investments.
Even the political
personnel of the left does not fully realise that the institutional framework
inherited from the previous period, is incapable of managing efforts to restart
the economy taking advantage of even neoliberal measures. The troika and the
successive greek governments supported only the banks and no other economic
sector, of services or materiel production. No choices were made by government
or representatives of the private sector to support such activities, because no
instruments exist to make such choices, and the illusion of the virtues of
individual enterpreneurial projects, continues to be the main strategic logic
of the existing institutional framework. The unlimited possibility of sending
savings to foreign banks, at a massive scale (before the capital controls
applied more than a year ago), was a tendency that also showed the reluctance
of the rich to support the national economy one way or the other.
All efforts to support
profitability adopted by the memoranda, were mainly used by the enterprises to
manage there debt, or increase their income reduced by the fall of demand and
sales. Pauperisation of middle class categories was the result of the recession
combined with the increase of taxation, which was not combined explicitly with
investment or social policies. The further deregulation of the labour market
served mainly for the survival and some times the development of a cheap
service economy, exploiting undeclared work, and low salaries. As neoliberal
measures did not prevent in the beginning of the years 2000 the evolution of
the economy towards a deep crisis, in the same way the repeated package of
deregulation measures are not capable now to redress a destroyed economy.
The political crisis in
such conditions, is caracterised by the absence of an internal dynamic of
managing the economic and social crisis, because of the absence of social
forces elaborating projects in that direction, and of state institutions
capable of filing that vacuum. This is the reason why all parts of the
opposition to the left government are supporting the neoliberal austerity, and
the idea that reduction of the state and in particular social spending and
salaries, are incentives capable of restarting private investment. The “Popular
Unity”, a party of ex-SYRIZA people, is opposed to austerity of course but
constitutes an old fashion statist left without any plan to reconstruct the
economy and society. It is a party that expresses the continuation of the
traditional incapacity of left organisations to elaborate plans for the economy
and society, as well as governance and financing methods. It remains confined
to ideological and general political choices.
The question of social
alliances that could form the dominant political alliance, and in a more
general way determine the evolution of the social structure and of the forms of
political expression of the various social forces, is the consequence of the
crisis and it’s governance. The people of the working class (of the mass of
salary earners of the private sector), already disorganised after the
“modernisation” process, have become a multitude of unemployed, underemployed,
undeclared or flexibly employed, who have almost completely lost the capacity
to defend themselves in an organised and collective manner. Important parts of
professionals have become unemployed or underemployed, and to a great extent
uncapable of paying social security. The organisations of employees of the
public sector and the banks, were opposed to austerity measures, but have
developed different strategies, ranging from direct left opposition to
austerity measures, to negotiation mainly with employers, through a mainly
independent defense of rights and advantages.
The electoral victories of
the left were the consequence of the very serious economic and social effects
of the memoranda, and the expression of a de facto alliance between “le monde
du travail” and the middle classes hit to various degrees by the austerity
measures. But the connection between these social strata and the left is loose
and originaly expressed through the language and the programmatic directions
referring to a model of an organised working class, which has nothing to do
with the present degree of social and political organisation of working people.
The continuing reference of the left language to notions as capitalist
development, social state, keynesian economics, social contract, show that the
point has been completely missed concerning the character of the crisis and the
successive programs managing this crisis. The alliance of working and part of
middle classes is opposed to the ruling alliance of various forms of capital
and the succesfull part of middle classes.
The particularity and the
special interest of the greek crisis is thus that we have a combination of an
economic and social collapse, of the absence of social forces willing to be the
driving forces of recovery and reconstruction, and of the absence of state or
public institutions which could be used by a left government to mobilise
ressources, social forces and productive capacities. The existence of such
institutions would not counter balance the effects of the memoranda, but could
support to a certain extent economic and social activity and social forces
capable of opposing the austerity and neoliberal strategy, and supporting the
streghtening of public policies and solidarity activities. The greek crisis
makes clear that the dynamic of neoliberal management of the economy and
further on of the economic crisis, leads to a multilevel destructive effect on
productive capacity, social institutions, public policy institutions, and also
productive influence of social classes, the capitalist class included.
4. A necessary transition
The left must understand
that coming out – one way or another – of a crisis is a process of transition
from one situation to another, with resources and productive capacities that
are known and given, and radical institutional innovations which are absolutely
necessary. This means that no miracle can occur concerning resources and
productive capacities, and that no real help can come from the existing
institutional framework as a whole. In particular, the continuing reference to
institutions of a keynesian model for the presentation of propositions aiming
to restart economic activity or rebuild social services, is a sign of lack of
realism and imagination about the real challenges we face. On the other hand,
the idea that political power is the key to the necessary radical institutional
changes, is a leap in vacuum common to most tendencies of the left, until the
moment they discover that governing needs a new alliance between existing
social forces, an adequate plan, adequate institutions and instruments, and
personnel capable of managing them.
The most troubling lesson
of the greek experience is that the programmatic expression of the radical new
social alliance cannot follow the known paths of the compromise of capital
accepting a contract with other classes, or the conquest of power by a
political party or armed force pretending to express and represent the majority
of the people. Now that it is obvious we can have neither of these two ways,
that we cannot expect capital to lead the reform of the economic and social
strategy, and assure its political support, or that we have discovered the non
existing capability of the left to even trace by itself the directions of an
alternative path, many difficult questions come up: how can the alliance of
working people and parts of the middle classes be strategicaly described and
sealed? How can the maintenance of this alliance be reproduced and
democraticaly approved and legitimised? Which institutional changes are
necessary to assure planning, management and financing according to the
strategic aims of this alliance? How can organic intellectuals and citizens be
educated to assume the new roles within the new institutions?
The fordist alliance was
offering the possibility of capital reproduction and accumulation, under the
domination of private capital, in exchange of security of employment and an
increase of revenues and social benefits for salary earners, although an
autocratic organisation of labour remained the rule. Knowledge production was
serving the technological and organisational improvements of capital
accumulation, but also the management of private or public entities. Most
institutions serving knowledge production and management of public and social
services were assumed to protect public interest. A new alliance which is not
dominated by private capital and expresses the common interests of popular
classes and part of the middle classes – of professionals, small enterpreneurs,
managers and well payed salary earners – cannot be constructed around the strategic
interests and domination of one class, but has to seek an agreement that must
be constructed through political and cognitive processes.
Since there is no dominant
class in this new alliance, it must be clear which are the particular interests
satisfied, which are the advantages for each social class or group, and how the
explicit participation of all is assured in the new framework of “collective
negotiations”, some groups of capitalist interests included. All groups
involved must negotiate a total implication in the global development plan,
which means that they must have the capacity to propose, negotiate and decide
explicitly about the use of resources, and their management. The implication of
public institutions is necessary, as the stabilisation of the functions
assuring the negotiation and decision process, at the levels of knowledge
production, political propositions, and implementation of policies, should be
based on groups elaborating programmatic propositions, structures permitting
democratic decision making, and instruments applying the political decisions
taken. Reforms of existing administration and institutions, or the creation of
new ones, should adopt these directions to complete a new institutional
framework, opposed to neoliberalism, and using by “upgrading” them some
institutions of the fordist regulation.
A transition is necessary
towards the adoption of aims that satisfy needs concerning material and
immaterial production, social services and environment, by the development of
activities which abandon capitalist relations of production, and to a great
extent the functioning of markets. Many different changes are necessary:
decisions of authorities at central or regional level that adopt the logic of
“common interest” concerning important choices of strategic importance,
satisfaction of political or social mobilisations, recognition of initiatives
of social movements, disponibility of social groups for participation to
“collective bargaining”, and disponibility of knowledge producing institutions
or informal knowledge groups. The necessity of transition means that such a
period is inevitable, during which some of the elements of the new model appear
and are established, and the activity of the left is turned towards the effort
to generalise these elements.
A model of a new general
institutional framework should be elaborated and constructed at the levels
where this is possible. The first important innovation should be the creation
(where they do not exist already) of “knowledge groups”, at sectoral, local and
national level, capable to elaborate plans, applying the basic directions for
the economy, society and the environment, adopted by the new class alliance.
The second innovation should be the creation of an assembly at local or sectoral
level (the parliament should be the core of such an assembly at national
level), representative of all groups of society and of social movements,
capable of deciding about the content of the corresponding plan. The third
innovation should be the creation of structures applying the decisions taken by
the assembly, with the necessary knowledge, human resources and experience, to
report also about the adequacy of the plans adopted. In many cases such
innovations could be implemented through the adaptation or reform of existing
institutions, but should be an explicit part of the corresponding programs of
the left parties, at all these levels.
Grass-root initiatives
concerning the development of social and solidarity economy, the self
-management of existing production units, the social solidarity activities, the
peer to peer production, the protection and production of common resources or
goods, are directly or indirectly related to strategic choices about
production, social services and the environment, but are also examples of new
methods of management. These new methods are about moving apart from capitalist
relations and market functions, through democratic decisions about production
processes and the offer of services, planning of the activities, adopting
explicit aims expressing common interests and needs of the people, deciding
about payments of salaries or social advantages through democratically adopted
political choices. The development and expansion of these initiatives
strengthen the will of public authorities to adopt democratic methods for the
elaboration of plans at local or sectoral level, and to gradually instaure the
management of the distribution of income and social benefits.
A decisive factor for the
strengthening of an anti-neoliberal alliance and the elaboration and
implementation of its strategy is the capacity of the majority class of salary
earners to become a decisive social and political force. This means that all
possibilities to reconstruct their organisational strength and presence should
be supported, through the development of trade unions, cooperatives and all
forms of social and solidarity economy, and further of the capacity to assume
workers control, self-management, and protection or creation of common
resources or goods. It must be understood that such an aim cannot be achieved
without an organisational process accompanied by an educational process and a
constant activity of programmatic elaboration. For the reconstruction and
renewal of the forms of organisation of salary earners, workers in the SSE and
commoners, and the substantial upgrading of their capacity to participate in
these processes, a great effort must be made in that direction, concerning
activities that have been seriously neglected by the parties of the left.
A series of radical
changes have to be made to guarantee the protection of common interest but also
the shift from the incentive of profit to the incentive of satisfactory revenue
and social services for all, and the satisfaction taken by participating to
improvement and fairness. Planning is not anymore about accumulation of capital
and growth, but about a productive, resource saving and distributional
perspective. New values can be fully adopted, which are still in the memories
of people who remember the solidarity and equality side of the fordist model,
or at least its ideal version. New strategic choices can make such a
perspective possible and viable:
- Full globalisation must
be questioned and the predominance of local production and balanced external
economic relations must lead to a new regulation of international economic
relations.
- Concerning the
production of durable goods, higher quality, longer duration, cyclical
production, free technology, can increase productivity and lower costs very
seriously.
- The new international
regulation can offer the possibility to produce consumer goods of high quality
based mainly on organic production, and make choices about the health of the
population.
- The increase of
renewable energy production must be accelerated, as the installation of a
genuine recycling process and decisive measures concerning the protection of
the environment.
- Public services in all
possible fields must be developed, reducing private consumption in favor of the
increase and the commonification of public services.
- The public control over
the creation of money and financing of the economy must be accelerated, at a
first stage through the implementation of complementary currencies.
- Redistribution of income
and wealth must be directly related to plans for production, social services
and environmental policies, especially concerning financial capital.
- Education and research
must expand to satisfy the need for knowledge production and increase of
“organic intellectuals”, and also education possibilities on common issues for
all.
There is no reason to
present this approach as a political program that can be fully implemented by a
left government or a coming revolutionary movement. It must be clear that the
transition can take many forms, and that popular mobilisation is necessary as
well as commitment by public authorities. It is, or should be a struggle on
many fronts, which should be accompanied by continuous programmatic elaboration
and education. The overwhelming majority of people long for justice and a
decent living, but must be fully informed about the dangers, the possibilities
and the choices that can be made, and must be convinced to participate in the
decision processes at all levels.
5. Concluding
Left parties aiming to
propose and implement a transition to a post-capitalist regime must adopt (or
readopt) fully developed activities of programmatic elaboration and education
of members, citizens and workers. Such an activity is a political choice, which
traditionally goes beyond commitment for the working class, and is based on the
necessity to elaborate and implement a project for society as a whole.
Revolutionary changes beyond capitalism has always been the aim of popular
classes allied to intellectual strata. An important legacy of fordist
capitalism still exists in the form of knowledge producing institutions, or the
generalised education and the high level of knowledge among the population. The
capacity of society to elaborate solutions to crucial economic, social and
environmental problems is greater than ever through the mobilisation of
scientific knowledge, expertise and practical experience of all.
As the insistence on
neoliberal strategies is destroying the reproductive capacity of national
economies, the left should adopt an independent programmatic, educational and
social activity stance to implement the transition to a post-capitalist regime.
In Greece this means that the elaboration of a “parallel program” should be
systematically organised, that the planning of activities that can protect the
working people and the population should have an absolute priority, and that in
particular, the country should increase its independence concerning banking and
the creation of money. The insistence of the greek government on the reduction
of the debt is of course correct, and must be supported, but the possible
increase of public resources should not lead to the revival of a keynesian
approach, and should increase the possibilities to implement public plans in the
direction of a reconstruction strategy.
General bibliographical
references
B.Coriat (2015), Le retour
des communs
G.Duménil, D.Lévy (2011),
The crisis of neoliberalism
M.Hardt, A.Negri (2009),
Commonwealth
J-L.Laville, J-L.Coraggio
(2016), Les gauches du XXIe siècle
J-L.Laville, A.Salmon
(2015), Associations et Action Publique
P.Mason (2015),
Postcapitalism
P2P Foundation, Commons
transition: policy proposals for an open knowledge commons society
There is a chance you're eligible for a new solar energy rebate program.
ΑπάντησηΔιαγραφήClick here and find out if you qualify now!